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A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is considered one of the most important techniques used to propagate trust in authentication
over the Internet. This technology is based on a trust model defined by the original X.509 (1988) standard and is composed of
three entities: the certification authority (CA), the certificate holder (or subject), and the Relying Party (RP). The CA plays the
role of a trusted third party between the certificate holder and the RP. In many use cases, this trust model has worked successfully.
However, we argue that the application of this model on the Internet implies that web users need to depend on almost anyone in the
world in order to use PKI technology. Thus, we believe that the current TLS system is not fit for purpose and must be revisited as a
whole. In response, the latest draft edition of X.509 has proposed a new trust model by adding new entity called the Trust Broker
(TB). In this paper, we present an implementation approach that a Trust Broker could follow in order to give RPs trust information
about a CA by assessing the quality of its issued certificates. This is related to the quality of the CA’s policies and procedures and
its commitment to them. Finally, we present our Trust Broker implementation that demonstrates how RPs can make informed
decisions about certificate holders in the context of the global web, without requiring large processing resources themselves.
1. Introduction
The need to identify our partners on the Internet constitutes
one of the major challenges in ensuring trust on the Internet.
However, multiple recent stories show that such an objective
is far from being reached.
On the 18th of February 2015, a security expert published
an image on Twitter [1] showing that Superfish is delivering
the certificate of Bank of America, instead of Verisign
(Figure 1). Supposedly, Lenovo integrated Superfish software
in some of its PC models, in order to inject advertisements
related to Google search results for users of IE and Chrome
web browsers. Doing this, Superfish can in fact intercept any
encrypted traffic of Lenovo users. To solve this issue, Lenovo
has issued a guide that helps users to remove Superfish [2].
In a similarway andmore recently (Nov 23, 2015), another
security expert showed how Dell has shipped computers that
make their future owners vulnerable to MITM attacks [3].
He showed that Dell has injected a root CA called eDellRoot
in two models of PCs along with its private key. The expert
explained that anyone could extract the private key and use it
to sign falsified certificates that will be accepted transparently
by the Dell PCs having the eDellRoot CA. Dell has provided
an official solution to remove the root CA as well as its private
key [4].
In both stories, the solution is to remove the CA and/or
software from the concerned computers. However, nothing
prevents similar stories appearing again in the future, and
these are not even malicious attacks. There are many more
examples of these; for example, Ye et al. [5] have shown how
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Figure 1: Bank of America’s certificate signed by Superfish instead
of Verisign.
malicious web sites can trick users into believing they have a
secure SSL session when they do not.
On the other hand, many other stories in the news show
that different CAs have either abused the trust that RPs
have in them or their systems have been hacked to issue
false certificates. For example, in June 2011, DigiNotar, a
Dutch CA, was hacked. The hackers made DigiNotar sign
hundreds of falsified certificates for high profile websites such
as Google and Facebook. One year after, DigiNotar declared
bankruptcy. Other stories showed how CAs have abused
the trust of RPs. For example, on 23 March, 2015, Google
discovered that China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC) issued an unconstrained intermediate certificate to
an Egyptian company that used this certificate to intercept
communications of web users accessingGoogle domains (i.e.,
a TLS MITM attack).
We believe that the main problem of the web TLS system
comes from the fact that web users must trust a multitude of
entities in order to secure their transactions. First of all, they
must trust their web browsers to validateweb sites’ certificates
on behalf of them. Trusting the certificate validators is not
limited to known web browsers because anyone has the right
to validate certificates on behalf of web users or trick users
into believing validation has occurred. Secondly, the same
web user has to trust directly hundreds of unknown CAs
provided by different OS/browser editors, because the latter
does not want to assume any responsibilities if something
goes wrong with any CA. In order to justify these bold
statements, we first need to list the obligations [6] ofweb users
before they should accept a public key certificate:
(1) Users should ensure the authenticity of the trust
anchor or “root” CA (i.e., ensure that the public key
of the CA belongs to the claimed CA).
(2) Users should trust the trust anchor CA to issue
certificates.
(3) Users should know that the subject’s certificate is
appropriate to the context of use.
(4) Users should ensure that the subject’s certificate is
valid, as well as all the certificates in the chain up
to the trust anchor’s certificate or public key (i.e.,
conform to the right standards).
To realize task 1, web users must get the certificate of a
“root” CA from a trusted source or by some out of band
means. According to RFC 5280, web users are supposed
to build their trust decisions (task 2) by analysing a set
of CA documents (Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification
Practice Statement (CPS)) to answermany technical and legal
questions like what happens when the CA does not correctly
check the identity of the certificate holder, or worse, when
it issues a certificate to a person with a false identity? What
happens if the certificate is false and makes me lose $1000? Is
the CA responsible? [7]. Executing the validation obligation
(task 4) is impossible for human users. Consequently, except
for task 3, no user is able to realize these tasks and must be
aided by trustworthy softwarewith trustworthy configuration
data. It should be noted that all these tasks must be executed
when in fact most of users do not have any knowledge
about what certification authorities are and, furthermore,
when they are in the middle of performing some much
more important application task (such as making a purchase
on the Internet). This was demonstrated through several
experimental studies [8–11].
Thus, web users must depend on other entities to help
them achieve these obligations. We use the term recom-
mender for those entities who provide the software and
configuration data. Web browsers are one of the best known
examples that users may use. Three categories of recom-
menders can be distinguished; the first category proposes
only to realize the validation obligation (task 4) and partially
task 3 by checking the key usage field, such asChrome,Opera,
and IE. The second category realizes tasks 1 and 2, such as
Microsoft andApple by distributing trust CA lists in their OS.
The third category implements tasks 1, 2, 3 (partially), and 4
on behalf of users, such as Firefox.
While the aforementioned examples of recommenders
are known entities, no countermeasure exists that may limit
the dependence of web users on other unknown entities.
For example, any unknown mobile application developer
may also realize the aforementioned obligations on behalf
of smartphone web users (how many unknown web clients
exist on AppStore and GooglePlay stores?). Additionally,
many mobile applications integrate embedded browsers into
their primary services, like the Facebook application. All
these kinds of recommenders may expose (intentionally or
not) web users to MITM attacks. Finally, any computer
manufacturer may also manipulate the list of CAs (realizing
tasks 1 and 2) before shipping the computers to their clients
(e.g., Dell).
Trusting different lists of CAs (trust list) provided by
different OS/browser editors can make the web users con-
fused. Indeed for the same website, a web user may get
different responses depending on the application (IE, FF, and
Chrome)/platform (Windows, Linux, and Android) adopted
by the user to access the website. On one hand the list of CAs
is different from one application/platform to another. On the
other hand, the quality of the validation process depends on
the understanding of the application/platform developer to
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Figure 2: Web users dependence on almost anyone for validating
certificates.
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Figure 3: Current trust model for web users.
the related standards, even when the latter may not be clear
about different points of validation [12].
From the trust point of view, the relation between the web
user and the recommenders is constructed on an unconscious
basis. Indeed, users are primarily concerned with their task
in hand (Internet surfing, social network, FTP client, buying
a computer, etc.) and they believe that no harm will come
to them when accepting the services of their recommenders.
We call this kind of relation unconscious trust (see Figures 2
and 3). This is in direct contrast to the relationship between
the certificate subject and their issuing CA. In this case the
subject has made a conscious decision to trust a particular CA
and has cemented this trust by paying the CA a fee for their
certificate.
In real life, all of us make unconscious trust decisions
to handle the complexity of our world [13]. For example,
we cross the streets without caring about car drivers and
we go to the street without carrying firearms. In this case,
our unconscious trust is justified by the rarity of bad events.
However, this unconscious trust transforms to conscious
trust only when the frequency of bad events increases. This
supposes that humans are able to detect the dangers and bad
events. However, on the Internet users are unable to detect
these problems; they depend on experts to detect them and
inform them. Clearly, web users on the Internet will continue
to depend unconsciously on the services of unknown entities.
The major risk of this kind of relation is that the uncon-
scious trust in recommenders is usually transformed into
unconditional trust that gives the recommenders complete
discretionary power over the web users.
Thus, the repeated attacks happening every day come
from the fact that web users trust almost everyone in the
world to validate the X.509 certificates they receive. This fact
leads us to ask the question: “what is the benefit of a PKI if in
the end we need to trust almost everyone in the world, in order
to be able to use it?” We believe that the current management
of thewebTLS system is broken and that PKIwith the current
management model is not fit for purpose.
Different programmes have been proposed to improve
the current web TLS system (e.g., Certificate Transparency
[14, 15], Sovereign Keys [16], and Public Key Pinning [17]).
While those programmes prove the deficiency of the current
web TLS system, they only partially handle the problems
of the current TLS system. For example, the Certificate
Transparency programme of Google proposes a public online
monitoring and auditing system. The objective is to bring
transparency to certificate issuing so that a web user can
detect in real time any fake certificate. The success of this
ambitious programme depends on the participation of all
TLS system stakeholders (OS providers, CAs, web browsers,
and domain owners). Currently only Google Chrome and
CAs that are issuing EV certificates are included in this
programme. Ultimately, this will help web users uniquely
to realize task 1, but not the other tasks. Thus, this kind
of solution increases the dependency of web users on other
unknown entities who are partially handling the web users’
needs.
It is important to consider the current TLS system
as a whole, which is built on the benevolence of all the
recommenders between the certificate subject and the web
user. We believe that providing end-to-end security between
certificate subjects and web users begins by the identification
of all the responsibilities of all the recommenders intervening
between web users and certificate subjects. The current web
TLS system must be improved to remove any source of
confusion for web users. The PKI industry soon realized that
the PGP approach for distributing public keys would not
work effectively or efficiently on the Internet. Havingmultiple
recommenders in PKI is moving nearer to the PGP trust
model. Entities that are providing the obligations of web users
should not be computer programs provided by any unknown
entity in the world.
Originally, X.509 was based on the 3-cornered trust
model (see Figure 4): the certification authority (CA), the
certificate holder (or subject), and the Relying Party (RP). In
a previous paper [18], we have shown that the original X.509
trust model is not sufficient for the Internet. We proposed
thus to add a new role of Trust Broker (TB) to the original
X.509 trust model (see Figure 5). The TB is independent of
CAs and plays the roles of both technical and legal expert
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Figure 5: The new X.509 trust model.
for helping the RPs (web users). By explicitly adding this
role to the original X.509 trust model, the task of RPs is
simplified, and the responsibility of the entity acting as a Trust
Broker can be formally engaged. From the user’s point of
view, whatever number of platforms and applications they
may use to access a website, they will always get the same
recommendation from their contracted TB to help them
make an informed decision.
It should be noted that assessing the trustworthiness of
a Trust Broker is much simpler than assessing the trustwor-
thiness of all Internet based CAs. Firstly, RPs only need to
assess their trust in a single TB who will then help them
decide about all certificates from all CAs. Secondly, RPs will
have a contractual agreement with their chosen TB, based on
local contract law, rather than having to rely on the many
different national contracts laws employed by the existing
CAs. In essence, choosing a TB will be similar to choosing
an insurance policy, which users are already familiar with.
Our contributions to the problem of trust management
for PKIs are multiple. In [19], we clearly identified the reasons
behind the interoperability problems of PKIs.This has helped
us to understand the root causes behind the failure of PKIs on
the Internet (open PKI deployment model). In [18], we have
proposed to formally extend the original X.509 trust model,
by adding the TB entity.This newmodel is now incorporated
in the eighth edition of the X.509 standard [20].
In [21], we proposed to quantify the quality of cer-
tificate (QoCER) to allow RPs to make a decision about
the certificate. The QoCER score is calculated based on
the evaluation of the procedures announced by the CAs
and their commitment to apply them. The QoCER value is
completed by another parameter, called the quality of control
(QoCTRL), which states the degree of confidence on the
value QoCER. Although, the couple (QoCER and QoCTRL)
can represent the information sent by the TB to the RP, this
calculation model suffers from multiple issues.
Issue A.The calculation of CAs’ reputations is subject to collu-
sion attack. Some recommenders (in particular unknownRPs
and certificate holders) can collude to improve the reputation
of CAs or inversely to incriminate well-behaved CAs.
Issue B.This calculationmodel does not describe precisely the
aggregation and the collection approaches of recommenda-
tions.
Issue C.The calculationmodel does not address the scalability
issue.This work does not help the TB entity to evaluate a large
number of CAs in a reasonable time.
Issue D. Finally, this work was theoretical only. We did not
study the issues related to users’ decision-making process.
The calculation proposed in [21] faces these issues because
the four-cornered trust model was not defined at that time,
and the problem of PKI interoperability was not clearly
expressed.
In this article, we improve our original calculationmodel.
The maturity that we gained from the PKI interoperability
issue and from the 4-cornered trust model has allowed us to
come up with a list of requirements that any trust calculation
modelmust conform to.These requirements are independent
from any trust calculation methods. In addition, we enhance
our calculation model to comply with these requirements, in
particular:
(1) This new calculation model addresses the problem
of collusion attack (issue A) by defining two groups
of recommenders: identifiable recommenders and
unknown recommenders.The recommendations sent
by identified entities can be automatically accepted
but weighted according to the degree that the TB
service believes in their recommendations. However,
the TB must validate the recommendations provided
by unidentified entities before being accepted. This
increases the reliability in the calculation. Equations
(5) and (8) have been updated in Section 4.2.2 to
implement this issue.
(2) We add a preparation stage (Section 4.2.1) to the
calculation of CAs’ reputation to copewith the second
issue (issue B). The TB entity can set the types of
recommenders, the collection method (automatic,
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manual, etc.), and the types of recommendations
(positive or negative) for each trust factor.
(3) The scalability issue (issue C) is handled by proposing
a semiautomatic evaluation process (cf. Figure 7).The
process is designed to be open to allow TB services to
deal with different kinds of CAs’ policies and to avoid
refusing CAs because of interoperability issues.
(4) Finally, we have implemented this calculation model
to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal in the
context of the web (Section 5). This implementation
highlighted some drawbacks in the original theoreti-
cal model in decision-making process (issue D). We
improve this point by (i) sending contextual infor-
mation to the RPs so that they can make informed
decisions about certificates and (ii) returning only one
quality value instead of two.
The rest of this document is structured as follows: Section 2
presents the existing trust building approaches that may help
RPs to make informed decisions about certificates. We show
that none of these approaches can be applied efficiently to
help RPs with unknown CAs, so in Section 3 we present
our unified approach along with a set of trust evaluation
criteria that any effective trust building approach must fulfil.
Section 4 presents our trust calculation model and we show
how it satisfies the criteria. In Section 5wepresent a prototype
implementation demonstrating how Internet users (RPs) can
make informed decisions about web server certificates. In
Section 6, we show how the 4-cornered trust model can
improve the security of web users. Finally, in Section 7, we
present our conclusions and proposed future work.
2. Existing Approaches to Building Trust
There are several alternative approaches that permit a RP to
trust a certificate but all entail two important mechanisms:
(i) A contractual process for recognizing CAs: this is
used to prove that a given CA meets the legal and
technical requirements of trustworthiness and inter-
operability.
(ii) A mechanism for conveying the recognition of trust-
worthyCAs into theRPs computer system: this is used
to provide information about the trustworthiness of
a CA in a machine-readable format, so that when
the RP’s software receives a digital certificate it can
automatically decide to accept it or not. This is
achieved via configuration of at least one root of trust,
or trust anchor, into the RP’s system by some out of
band means. Subsequently certificate chains can be
carried in an application level protocol. Providing the
chain starts at an already configured root of trust, then
the entire set of CAs in the certificate chain can be
trusted.
The alternative approaches can be classified into three main
categories: (1) trust topologies managed by CAs themselves,
(2) a list of roots of trust managed by the RP or by a trusted
third party (TTP) that is independent of the CAs and is acting
on behalf of the RP, and (3) a hybrid approach in which roots
of trust are managed by the RP or a TTP and subordinate
CAs are managed by the CAs themselves. One of the main
differences between these approaches is their applicability
to deployment models of PKI, closed or open. The open
deployment model is where all CAs on the Internet are able
to be trusted by RPs, whereas the closed deployment model
is where only a limited subset of CAs can be trusted.
The implementation of CA managed topologies in the
open model is not feasible. One could imagine a topology
composed of cross-certified national root CAs in which each
root CA manages cross-certification processes with their
subordinate CAs located in their jurisdictions. However, even
this cannot be easily achieved for several reasons:
(i) Technically, this topology cannot be implemented
because of the difficulty of managing long certifi-
cation paths [22]. The validation process requires
several checks to be made along the certification path
(e.g., policy constraints, certificate status, and policy
mappings). The complexity increases with the size of
the certificate chain.
(ii) This topology is similar to a general accreditation sys-
tem where all CAs must be certified by their national
authorities. However, countries do not have the same
viewpoint concerning the right organizational model
of PKIs. For certain countries, national accreditation
may limit innovation and competition between CAs.
(iii) Imagining that the national CAs (root or bridge)
can cross-certify each other implies that a technical
and legal harmonization can be conceived between
different nations. In reality this is too difficult to
achieve because of cultural and legal differences
between countries.
(iv) This topology requires a standardization of the certifi-
cation process so that a cross-certification realized by
one national CA would be accepted by other national
CAs.However, there is no standard cross-certification
process today.
Alternatively, trust in a certificate can be recommended by
any entity independent of CAs. Users in a given community
of interest can obtain information and advice from the leader
of this community about the relevance of certificates for
their transactions.This recommender should have a technical
and legal expertise sufficient to inform its users about the
relevance of a certificate for a given type of transaction. The
recommender could be a government (e.g., PKI Gatekeeper
in Australia [23]) or any organization such as a software
vendor (e.g., Microsoft or Mozilla).
In general, the recommenders create a list of minimum
requirements and recognize all CAs whose certificates have
assurance levels greater than the minimum requirements.
Web browsers are the best known examples of this approach
(Microsoft Root Certificate Program [24] and Mozilla CA
Certificate Policy Inclusion [25]).
In contrast to the previous approach, this approach has
only one mechanism used to transmit the recognition of
certificates, which is the trust list. There is no homogeneous
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way to define or formalize the trust lists. While some lists of
certificates are just simple lists (e.g., stores of certificates in
web browsers) where RPs can themselves add, edit, or delete
certificates, others can be signed lists by the recommender
where RPs cannot modify the list. From an interoperability
viewpoint, the trust list replaces the cross-certificates used by
CA managed topologies. The user trusts the issuer of the list
and transitive trust extends this to the CAs contained in the
list. As a consequence, the issuer of the list plays the role of
trust anchor but is not a CA.
Thanks to the independence of the recommender from
CAs and the absence of need to build certification paths
for the validation of certificates, the recognition approach
is more convenient to the open deployment model of PKIs.
However, the current application of this approach is not
optimal for the open deployment model, for several reasons:
(i) The nature of the RP’s relation with the recommender
is not formally defined. It can be formal as in the case
of the Gatekeeper strategy [23] or nonformal as in the
case of web browsers.
(ii) The cross-recognition process is a manual nonre-
producible process; it is performed manually by
experts who should examine very large documents
that include a lot of political and legal information.
(iii) This approach provides only a binary response, rec-
ognized or not. Unrecognized certificates are not
banned to RPs since they are constantly exposed to
them and a decisionmust be made. For unrecognized
certificates, RPs may still be invited to inspect the
policies of CAs to decide whether the certificates
are suitable for their transactions or not. The best
known example is the web browser, when RPs receive
certificates signed by CAs that are not included in the
trust list of their browser. The RP is asked to take a
decision about the untrusted CA’s certificate.
In the hybrid approach, the roots of trust are managed by
the RP or a TTP on the RP’s behalf, and additional CAs are
managed by the root CAs themselves. These additional CAs
are termed subordinate CAs (of the root CA) and are fully
trusted by the root CA. Consequently certificate chains are
received by the RP and certificate path processing is required
by the RP’s software. The hybrid approach is the one used on
the Internet today in the open deployment model.
3. The Unified Approach: A New Approach for
Building Trust in X.509 Certificates
Establishing trust in a certificate requiresmanaging technical,
organizational, and legal issues. This task is complex, so that
only technical and legal experts can perform it. It is not
conceivable to delegate this task to unskilled people acting as
RPs. To address this challenge, we propose a new approach for
managing the trust in certificates, which we call the “unified
approach.”This can help RPs to take efficient decisions about
certificates for both the open and closed PKI deployment
models.
Our approach combines the advantages of the current
trust topologies. It goes further by realizing new criteria that
can increase the efficiency of the RP’s trust decision, such as
the reliability of recommendations.
In the closed model, the administrators of PKIs and
the jurists of organizations play the roles of technical and
legal experts to help their respective employees to decide
about certificates coming from other organizations. The
trust relationship between RPs and their experts is naturally
created because they belong to the same organization. The
trust of the RPs in their administrators is not only related
to the quality of the certificates they provide but also on
their ability to recommend the CAs of other organizations.
In addition, the decisions of the RPs can be automatically
configured because the interconnection topologies are often
built for a predefined number of services related to the nature
of the collaboration between the organizations.
In the open model, the situation is far more complex for
several reasons:
(i) There is no explicit and balanced predefined trust
relationship between RPs and experts. For example,
web browser editors play implicitly this role as they
manage a list of trustedCAs, but there is no agreement
between the RPs and the editors to hold the editors
responsible for the information they provide.
(ii) The scope of the certificate’s usage is open (i.e., not
limited to predefined specific services). The conse-
quence is that web browsers do not provide enough
information to make an informed decision. The rec-
ommendation is binary (trusted or not recognized,
e.g., an icon in the URL bar is blue or not). All trusted
CAs are stored in the same trusted list; therefore
CAs with different trust levels are equally trusted
regardless of the usage of the certificate.
All these ad hoc solutions, either for the open (e.g., web
browser approach) or for the closed model implicitly, include
the role of expert. The differences lie in the nature of the
entities playing the role of expert, in the type of trust linking
the expert with the RPs, and in the nature of the information
that the expert supplies to RPs.The role of the expert has been
added to the latest X.509 trust model, as shown in Figure 5.
This explicitly separates the role of certificates’ manager from
the role of expert. Thus, the new trust model for X.509 PKIs
is composed of four entities: the Trust Broker, RPs, certificate
holders, and CAs. Each entity in this approach has a specific
task/responsibility as follows:
(i) CAs are responsible for managing certificate lifecy-
cles.
(ii) Certificate holders must responsibly use the certifi-
cates given to them by the CAs.
(iii) RPs must take decisions whether to accept certificates
or not.
(iv) TBs are responsible for evaluating CAs on behalf of
RPs (analysis of CP/CPS, auditors, etc.).
The TB evaluates the CAs and sends recommendations to
RPs for helping them to take informed decisions about
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certificates. In this case, the trust model becomes fairer to
RPs because they are protected by one entity, that is, their
technical and legal expert. According to this model, RPs
rely only on the recommendations of their technical and
legal expert and not on each and every CA presented by the
certificate holders. The relation between the TB and the RP
must be regularized by an explicit contractual agreement. In
such an agreement, the TB recognizes its responsibility to
the RP about its provided recommendations and respects the
privacy of the RP. The TB must be independent from the
CAs. However, its relationship with CAs may be regularized
by explicit agreements, so that the TBs can transfer the
responsibility to a CA when a false recommendation is
given due to incorrect information provided by the CA. The
contractual agreements between the RPs and the TBs can be
achieved in several ways:
(i) By commercial services, similar to insurance services,
whose business model is to sell recommendations
about certificates
(ii) By national organizations whose role is to protect
consumers
One of the main advantages of the TB approach is that it
resolves the interoperability problem of PKIs by transform-
ing it into a trust management problem. The persistence
of interoperability problems creates a trust management
problem; if there was a compatibility between PKIs at the
juridical, organizational, and technical levels, there would not
be a trust management problem because there would be a
limited number of classes of globally accepted certificates,
where each class met a specific context of use. However, the
cultural juridical and technical differences between coun-
tries are profound. Thus this theoretical solution cannot be
implemented in practice. The TB approach does not remove
the interoperability obstacles, but rather it admits their
existence and tries to inform RPs about the risks resulting
from the interoperability problems. This approach accepts
interoperability problems because it handles all certificates
regardless of the technical and legal rules applied when
generating the certificates. In the following sections, we first
give a definition of trust in a CA and then define a list
of criteria that the unified approach must meet. Finally we
present our underlying trust calculation model.
3.1. Trust in Certification Authorities. The phrase “trust in a
CA” has been used without explaining what it means exactly
from the perspective of RPs. It is important to define this
concept before presenting the calculation model. One should
differentiate between the terms “trust in a CA” and “trust in
a PKI.” Thus, “trust in a PKI” implies trust in all the CAs
that a PKI contains. However, for the RP that is executing a
transaction, it is only important to evaluate the trust it can
have in the CA that has signed the certificate used in the
transaction and in every CA between this CA and the root
of trust.
Although trust seems intuitive to humans, there is no con-
sensus on one single definition. The concept of trust suffers
from an imperfect understanding, a plethora of definitions,
and informal use in the literature as well as in everyday life
[26]. This is compounded on the Internet, where different
meanings and terminologies can be identified by language
and/or culture. For example, the English language provides
two words to express two dimensions of trust: “trust” and
“confidence,” while the French language knows only one
word “confiance.”The English language also provides concise
and accurate terms to refer to the partners in a trusting
relationship, namely, trustor and trustee, whereas the French
language lacks these nouns.
The differences between the definitions of trust are also
found depending on the discipline of the authors. Psychology
[27], sociology [28, 29], and philosophy [30, 31] are all
disciplines that have devoted efforts to the study of trust.
However, by inspecting these definitions, we find that they
are generic and applicable to many areas.Theymay implicitly
include many aspects. It is therefore necessary to specify the
definition of trust that explicitly details all the important
aspects of trust in a given area.
In our view, trust in a CA from the perspective of a RP
must be established in terms of the security and reliability
of the CA’s services. This depends upon both human and
computer systems. However, the characteristics on which we
rely to trust technological systems are different from those to
trust humans. Jøsang [32] explains this difference in the field
of information security as follows:
(i) The security that emerges from a human being is
benevolence to that person, while the security of a
system is the ability to resist attacks. The benevolence
of a person means that he/she is honest and straight.
(S)he is honest if (s)he respects their words and
straight if (s)he respects the rules.
(ii) The reliability of a person is represented by his/her
qualities such as experiences and skills, while the
reliability of a system is its ability to continually
perform a specific task.
Thus, the security and reliability of a CA’s services are
dependent upon the security and the reliability of all the
entities involved in the certification process, both human and
technological. As a consequence, we define the trust in a CA
as “Dependence on the ability of people, systems, physical
locations, and software of a CA, as well as on the benevolence
of the CA provider to provide the required security services
while complying with the relevant legislations.”
In this definition, we consider people are the individuals
working in both the CA’s and PKI provider’s organizations.
Their security characterizes their commitments to the secu-
rity policies (CP/CPS) and the relevant legislations, while the
reliability represents their skills and experiences in the field
of PKI. The security of systems and software is the ability of
these entities to resist attacks, while their reliability means
that they are capable of performing tasks continually and
without errors.
The given definition demonstrates the expectations of
RPs towards CAs. The expectations of certificate holders
towards their CAs are defined through contracts. Similarly,
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Figure 6: The TB service.
the relationship between RPs and their TBs will be regular-
ized through contracts.
3.2. Trust Evaluation Criteria. Trust evaluation in both the
closed and the open models of PKIs should realize the
following six criteria (note that we do not specify general
software engineering criteria such as efficiency and ease of
use):
Criterion 1 (the evaluation process should be carried out by
an expert on behalf of the RP). The recognition of a CA at
the technical and legal level is too complex for most users;
therefore it should be made by an expert working on behalf
of the RPs.
Criterion 2 (recommendation retrieval should be simple and
dynamic). The process of retrieving trust recommendations
from an expert should be as simple as possible for RPs and
should be dynamic to cater for changing situations.
Criterion 3 (certificate evaluation should be global in scope).
The approach should be able to analyse all certificates that RPs
may receive, regardless of the technical, legal, or geographic
position of the issuing CA.
Criterion 4 (recommendations should be relevant to the
context of use). Trust recommendations must be as relevant
as possible to the context of use (e.g., authentication of
FTP server, bank server, or merchant server for a payment
transaction). This allows RPs to take the most effective
decision without applying considerable mental effort.
Criterion 5 (the privacy of the RP should be respected). The
expert should not learn anything about the transaction the
RP wishes to undertake.
Criterion 6 (the reliability of the recommendations). The
trust evaluation must consider the reliability of the trust
recommendations.
4. Trust Calculation Model
To help RPs decide about the trustworthiness of subject
certificates, a set of quantitative and qualitative information
is sent to them. The Trust Broker (TB), as proposed in the
new X.509 trust model, fulfils the first criterion and can
set up a service that provides this information to RPs (see
Figure 6).The retrieval of recommendations can therefore be
made simple and dynamic (Criterion 2). Furthermore, there
is no need to handle long certificate validation paths as is
the case for CA managed topologies. In the TB model, the
TB is the root of trust for all CAs. Consequently, the RP
only needs to send the CA’s certificate to the TB service. The
subject’s certificate is not needed, since the CA applies the
same procedure to all its issued certificates. Furthermore, this
satisfies the 5th criterion or privacy, since the TB does not
knowwhich certificate holder the RP is communicating with.
The TB service returns other information that can help
the RP to make an informed decision. For example, when an
RP needs to know the liability of the CA in case of problem.
The determination of any liability information is obtained
from the CP of the CA by the TB service and relayed as other
information to the RP. In addition, we have added a context
detector at the side of the RP in order to detect the actual
application context. By doing this, the TB service realizes the
4th criterion.
At a purely quantitative level, the TB service sends a
score between 0 and 1 that represents the trustworthiness
of the subjects’ certificates in general, called the certificate
level of assurance (CLoA). This satisfies the 3rd criterion.
When the CLoA is 0, the CA’s procedures for managing the
subjects’ certificates are judged by the TB to be very weak
or nonexistent. When the CLoA is 1, the applied procedures
are judged to be very strong and faultless. The calculation
of CLoA depends on multiple factors, namely, the CA’s
published procedures (QoCPS), the CA’s actual procedures
(QoCA), and the confidence the TB has in the CA to adhere
to its procedures (CL). This satisfies Criterion 6.
To calculate the certificate level of assurance (CLoA), we
propose the following formula:
CLoA = 𝑛√CL ∗QoCA ∗QoCPS, (1)
where (i) QoCPS ∈ [0, 1] represents the robustness of the
CA’s published procedures in its CP/CPS documents. The
value 0 represents the weakest procedures and 1 the strongest
procedures. (ii) QoCA ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of the
CA’s commitment to its published procedures. It is based
on recommendations provided by third parties that monitor
the real practices of a CA such as audit agencies and the
RPs themselves. The value 0 represents that there is no
evidence to indicate that any statements in the CP/CPS
have been respected, while 1 indicates that every statement
in the CP/CPS has been implemented according to the
recommenders. (iii) CL ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of
confidence that the TB has in its calculation of QoCA (we
assume the TB always has 100% confidence in its calculation
of QoCPS). The value 0 means either there is no evidence on
which to calculate QoCA or the TB has zero confidence in the
evidence that is there, while the value 1 indicates that there is
adequate evidence for the TB to validate every statement in
the CP/CPS. CL can be 1 when QoCA is zero, meaning that
the TB is certain that QoCA is low. (iv) 𝑛 is an integer value
that allows the TB to control the impact of CL∗QoCA on the
score of CLoA.
The maximum value of CLoA is QoCPS because QoCPS
represents the published robustness of the CAs procedures
for managing certificates. However, this maximum value can
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Figure 7: The semiautomatic process for computing QoCPS.
be degraded because either the CA does not fully respect its
own procedures, or the TB does not have full confidence in
either the CAs stated procedures or the recommendations
about them.This means the value of both CL and QoCA can
decrease the value of QoCPS to reflect the TB’s assessment of
the overall CLoA.
4.1. Computing theQuality of the CPS (QoCPS). We introduce
a semiautomatic process used to determine the quality of
the CP/CPS documents, as shown in Figure 7. We propose
a technique for structuring CP/CPS documents so that they
can be understood by computers, and then an algorithm
will be used to determine the quality level of the CP/CPS
documents (QoCPS).
4.1.1. CP/CPS Structuring. The natural language used for
describing the Certificate Policy and practices of a CA is
one of the main obstacles in determining the trustworthiness
of a CA. In order to automatically interpret the CP/CPS
documents, we model the CP/CPS documents as a tree
structure (as illustrated in Figure 8) inspired by the de facto
standard RFC 3647, which defines a common framework
for CP/CPS documents. The structure is composed of nodes
and leaves, where leaves are atomic trust factors and nodes
are complex trust factors (i.e., a combination of atomic and
complex factors).
For example, “Technical Security Controls” is a node
composed of the following nodes, where ≪≫ represents a
node and <> represents a leaf:
(i) ≪Key Pair Generation and Installation≫
(ii) ≪Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls≫
(iii) ≪Other Aspects of Key Pair Management≫
(iv) ≪Activation Data≫
(v) ≪Computer Security Controls≫
(vi) ≪Life Cycle Security Controls≫
(vii) ≪Network Security Controls≫
(viii) ≪Time Stamping≫
The node ≪Key Pair Generation and Installation≫ is com-
posed of the following nodes:
(i) ≪Key Pair Generation≫
(ii) ≪Private Key Delivery to Subscriber≫
(iii) ≪Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer≫
(iv) ≪CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties≫
(v) ≪Key Sizes≫
(vi) ≪Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality
Checking≫
(vii) ≪Key Usage Purposes≫
The node ≪Key Sizes≫ may have the following trust
factors (leaves):
(i) <6.1.5.f1[X,Y]> represents size 𝑋 of the public key of
the CA certificate for algorithm𝑌, for example, [1024,
ElGamal].
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Figure 8: Weighted CP/CPS tree structure.
(ii) <6.1.5.f2[X]> represents the hash algorithm used by
the certificate of CA, where 𝑋 ∈ {SHA-1, SHA-224,
MD5}.
(iii) <6.1.5.f3[X,Y]> represents the public key size 𝑋 of
certificate user for algorithm 𝑌.
(iv) <6.1.5.f4[X]> represents the hash algorithm used by
the certificate user, where 𝑋 ∈ {SHA-1, SHA-224,
MD5}.
The node ≪Key Pair Generation≫ may have the following
leaves:
(i) <6.1.1.f1[X]> represents cryptographic modules used
by CAs for the generation of keys according to the
requirements of standard 𝑋, where 𝑋 ∈ {FIPS 140-
1 level 1, FIPS 140-1 level 2, FIPS 140-1 level 3}.
(ii) <6.1.1.f2[X]> represents cryptographic modules used
by users for generation of keys according to the
requirements of standard 𝑋, where 𝑋 ∈ {FIPS 140-
1 level 1, FIPS 140-1 level 2, FIPS 140-1 level 3}.
(iii) <6.1.1.f3[X]>: generating the key pairs of the end user
is performed by the user himself, where 𝑋 ∈ {Oui,
Non}.
(iv) <6.1.1.f4[X]>: generating of the key pairs of the end
user is performed by the CA or RA, where 𝑋 ∈ {Oui,
Non}.
In each leaf, the TB service defines a set of possible values
that are semantically known by the TB and the CA.The types
of values can be simple answers (yes/no), numerical values,
dates or names of standards, and so forth. The trust factors
must be independent of each other; if not, they must form a
complex node. We give each trust factor a reference number
that corresponds to the section number of RFC 3647.
The obtained structured file constitutes the knowledge
of the TB at time 𝑡. This knowledge can be represented in
an XML file. The knowledge about a particular CA can be
completed in one of two ways. Either the TB can download
the CA’s CP/CPS, read it, and complete the XML file himself
with the CA’s published values, or the TB can send the XML
file to the administrator of the CA and ask the latter to
complete it. If the answerer finds the XML file is sufficient
to represent a CA’s CP/CPS, then the quality of the CPS can
be automatically calculated (see next section). Otherwise the
answerer should indicate to the TB that new values from the
CP/CPS aremissing in theXMLknowledge file, so that theTB
can analyse them and extend his knowledge. For example, if
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Table 1: Trust Utility function for the atomic trust factor 6.1.5.f1 of
Key Sizes.
Utility Algorithm
0 (256, RSA)
0 (512, RSA)
0,25 (1024, RSA)
0,8 (2048, RSA)
0,9 (2048, ElGamal)
1 (4096, RSA)
one CA uses a hash algorithm XYZ that is not present in the
knowledge file, then this should be indicated to the TB so that
it can be considered for the next version of the file.
4.1.2. The Calculation of the Quality of CP/CPS Documents.
To determine the QoCPS value, the TB must first define the
relative importance of each factor with regard to the other
factors (Figure 8) that comprise a complex node. The relative
importance of all arcs leading to a node must add up to 1.0.
For each atomic trust factor, the TB uses a utility function
to define the relative importance of each possible value with
regard to the other values. For example, Table 1 represents
the utility function for the atomic trust factor <6.1.5.f1[X,Y]>
of node ≪Key Sizes≫. It gives the value 0.25 if the key size
is 1024 bits, and the algorithm is RSA. It gives the value 0.9
when the key size is 2048 bits and the algorithm is ElGamal.
The QoCPS value is the recursive weighted sum of all utility
functions for all the atomic trust factors:
QoCPS (𝜑𝑖) = ∑
𝑗∈children(𝑖)
𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 ∗QoCPS (𝜑𝑗) , (2)
where (i) 𝜑𝑖 is a node and 𝜑𝑗 is a node or a leaf and (ii)
QoCPS(𝜑𝑗) = 𝑈(𝑉𝜑𝑗) where 𝜑𝑗 is atomic trust factor. 𝑈 is
the utility function. The utility function allows TBs to define
different strategies for trust calculations and forms part of
their intellectual property. 𝑉𝜑𝑗 represents selected value for
the atomic trust factor 𝜑𝑗; (iii) 𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 is the weight between the
factors 𝜑𝑗 and 𝜑𝑖 in the CP/CPS tree.
Clearly, the values of atomic trust factors will evolve over
time. These values may be added, changed, or even deleted.
Similarly, the utility function must be able to evolve over
time. For example, the strength of a cryptographic algorithm
todaywill not be the same after several years.The values given
to the various atomic trust factors and utility functions are
determined by the TB according to his expertise. This is his
intellectual property and will determine in part the value of
his TB service in the market place.
Finally, in order to enable the TB to handle all CAs
regardless of their technical and juridical level, the list of input
values for the atomic trust factors must be published by the
CAs in their CP/CPSs. For example supposing that the TB
service has the following values {SHA-1, SHA-224, MD5} for
the hash algorithm trust factor. If a CA uses an algorithm not
included in the list (such as SHA-512), the TB service analyses
this value, and it updates the corresponding utility function
and references it in the revised list of values.
4.2. Computing the Quality of CA (QoCA). The objective
of the quality of CA (QoCA) is to show the degree of
commitment of the CA to its CP/CPS documents. Naturally,
the audit agencies are the main entities that can provide
information about the real commitments of CAs. In fact, the
role of the audit agency is very important because a lot of
practices can be only understood and reviewed by it. By virtue
of the audit agency, the authentication of the evaluated CA
is guaranteed and its claims in the CPS file are ensured. For
example, the audit agency is the only entity that is able to
verify the claim of the CA when it states that its private key is
generated and stored in a physically secured environment.
However, the audit agency is not sufficient to provide a
reliable guarantee of total conformity for different reasons
[33]:
(i) Time. The verification made by an auditing agency is
neither continuous nor permanent. An audit agency
evaluates a CA every year or two.This means that the
evaluation conducted a year ago may not reflect the
current state of the CA, for example, how to ensure
that the list of revoked certificates is available 24/7.
(ii) Number of Certificates. An audit agency cannot verify
all certificates issued by a CA, for example, how to
verify that a CA has really respected the announced
certificate profile in its CP/CPS for each one of
thousands of certificates and how to verify that none
of these certificates are free of errors (e.g., DSA
certificates with 2048-bit primes or RSA certificates
with a public exponent equal to 1).
(iii) The Independence of Audit Agencies. It is difficult to
guarantee the independence of audit agencies from
CAs, especially because audit agencies are paid by
the CAs to perform the evaluation. We recognize that
auditors may need the permissions of the CAs to
release their results to the TB services. Governments
must ensure that CAs give this right to auditors or at
least that a summary of their results is made available
to TB services.
In addition, we propose new entities that can help in verifying
the real commitments of a CA to its CP/CPS documents:
(i) Clients of TB Service. An RP depends on the TB
service for providing her with the necessary infor-
mation to take an informed decision. (S)he can also
play the role of a recommender to the TB service by
providing it with information about the correctness
of some of the parameters announced by a CA dur-
ing certificate validation, for example, availability of
CRLs. The RP may also be a certificate holder so that
it can send the TB service some recommendations
about the commitments of its CA. TB clients can
only supplement the assessment of the audit agencies
because many parameters of the CP/CPS such as
physical controls (e.g., fire prevention and protection
of premises), procedural controls (e.g., procedures to
ensure segregation of duties), or personal checks (e.g.,
qualification and experience) can only be verified by
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an audit agency. The recommendations sent by the
TB’s clients may need to be verified by the TB service
to ensure their veracity. Among the parameters that
can be recommended by TB clients are the following:
(a) The availability of a CA’s 24/7 revocation service:
this can be analysed by the RP when validating
a certificate. When the revocation service is
not available the RP can automatically send
(negative) recommendations to the TB service.
(b) The certificate profile can be verified automati-
cally by an RP, to say whether it conforms to the
declarations in the CA’s CP/CPS documents or
not (e.g., key usage extension). The TB provides
the RP with this when it sends the CLoA.
(ii) Competitor TB Services. TB services can share their
experiences with other TB services who they know
or compete with, in order to help determine the real
commitment of a CA. This is similar to insurance
companies sharing information today. In addition,
cooperation between TB services can facilitate certain
actions, such as the confirmation of the actual exis-
tence of a CA or an audit agency. The relationships
between TB services could be regulated through
bilateral agreements or trade associations. Bilateral
agreements can be easily constructed, because all TB
services have the same motivation, which is increas-
ing the scope and efficiency of their evaluations.
Each TB service can control the impact of other TB
services on its final result (CLoA, CL, etc.) according
to the trust it has in the competitor TB service.
Competitor TB servicesmay be reluctant to cooperate
with other TB services, especially when they are
competing in the same market, but trade associations
help competitors to collaborate. TB services that are
dominant in different markets may cooperate for
mutual benefit. For example, a French TB servicemay
cooperate with a Japanese TB service so that they can
exchange useful information about CAs’ certificates
used by their clients.
Thus, we have a participative system that can be used to
compute the QoCA. We propose to apply these trust and
reputation management approaches in order to compute this
value. We have selected the REGRET model [34], which is a
modular approach formanaging trust and reputation. It takes
into account three dimensions:
(i) The Personal Dimension. It refers to direct interac-
tion between entities. When entity A gives certain
promises to entity B, then entity B scores entity A
according to its real commitment to its promises. For
example, seller A sets a date for the delivery of a
product to customer B. If the product arrived after
that date, then entity B negatively scores seller A based
on the negative impact of the delay. If the product
arrived on time, entity B positively scores seller A
because it has respected its promises.
(ii) The Social Dimension. With the social dimension,
the REGRET model adds the ability to reflect the
characteristics of complex social relationships using
the group concept. In many societies, a person inher-
its the reputation of the group to which it belongs.
When direct experiences with an entity are missing,
the reputation of its group gives initial expectations
about the behaviour of the entity. In the same way,
an entity may use the experiences of the members of
its own group, or the group of the unknown entity, to
complete its expectations about the unknown entity.
However, we do not consider the group that the CA is
a member of when calculating the reputation of that
CA. In our case, the social dimension is calculated
based on the recommendations sent by clients of the
TB and other TBs it has a relationship with.
(iii) The Ontological Dimension. The REGRET model
assumes that the reputation of a person is not a
single and abstract concept, but rather a multifaceted
concept. For example, the reputation of an airline is
based on the reputation of its aircraft, its baggage
handling, its check-in procedures, and its on board
catering. In turn, the reputation of an aircraft summa-
rizes the reputation of the maintenance service, the
manufacturer, the engine, and other characteristics.
These types of reputation and the way they are
combined is the ontological dimension of reputa-
tion. Note that each person could have a different
ontological structure to combine reputations and a
different way to moderate their importance. In our
case the ontological dimension of trust in a CA is the
amalgamation of many different atomic trust factors
arising from the CP/CPS documentation.
In order to calculate the QoCA using this model, the nature
of the recommendation values should be changed. Instead
of the recommenders providing their personal evaluations
to the TB, they should provide the actual values of the
CA parameters; then the evaluation of these parameters
can be made by the TB service. For example, when a CA
states in its certification policy that the download time of a
CRL list should not exceed 30ms, the recommenders value
should be the actual time, for example, 40ms, and not its
recommendation score, for example, a number between 0
and 1. When calculating the QoCA, the following stages are
proposed for the TB service.
4.2.1. Preparation Stage. The TB service should consider a
number of important points for each trust factor:
(i) Types of recommenders: the TB must determine for
each trust factor which recommenders can validate
it. The list of recommenders depends on the nature
of the trust factor and some can be validated only by
audit agencies.
(ii) The collectionmethod of recommendations: this may
differ according to the nature of the trust factors and
recommenders. Audit agencies could send periodic
reports to the TB service containing all the real values
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found during the audit (subject of course to the agree-
ment of the CA).The RPs, the certificate holders, and
other TB services could send their recommendations
either spontaneously, periodically, or on request. For
example, for the trust factor “the availability of the
24/7 revocation service,” the RPs could periodically
notify the TB service about this factor, while for
the trust factor “in case CA is compromised, the
CA should spontaneously notify all subscribers and
RPs about the compromise” the collection could be
spontaneous. On request collection can be achieved
through various techniques including the use of
questionnaires, web forms, and e-mail messages.
(iii) Types of recommendations: the TB must determine
whether the recommenders should send positive
recommendations (when confirming promises) or
negative ones (in case of nonfulfilment of promises).
4.2.2. Calculation Stage. To calculate the value of QoCA, the
TB service should take into account the personal, social, and
ontological dimensions. Two types of recommenders should
be considered in the calculation: identifiable recommenders,
which are audit agencies, competitor TB services, certificate
holders, and client RPs, and unknown recommenders, which
are RPs who are not clients and whose identities are not
known by the TB service.
The identification of the recommenders helps in imple-
menting anticheating mechanisms that neutralize suspect
recommendations. The recommendations sent by identified
entities can be automatically accepted butweighted according
to the degree that the TB service believes in their recom-
mendations. The weight factor indicates the impact that the
recommender can have on the final score. Determining this
weight factor is part of the intellectual property of the TB
and is one of the factors in distinguishing between TBs.
Recommendations provided by unidentified entities must be
validated by the TB before being accepted. If the cost of
the validation of a specific trust factor is low, for example,
checking that an OCSP server is available or not, then both
negative and positive recommendations from unidentified
RPs can be accepted; otherwise the TB service should only
validate negative recommendations as these show that theCA
is failing in some respect.
Each recommender sends a recommendation 𝑟 that has
the following form:
𝑟 = (𝑠, ca, 𝜑, V, 𝑡) , (3)
where the entity 𝑠 (sender) indicates the set of actual values V
of the atomic trust factors 𝜑 when it had an experience with
a certification authority ca at time 𝑡.
Let 𝑅 be the set of all possible recommendations. We
define 𝑅𝑠→ca𝜑𝑗 ⊆ 𝑅 as the set of the recommendations sent by 𝑠
about ca for the atomic trust factor 𝜑𝑗:
𝑅𝑠→ca𝜑𝑗 = {𝑟 = (𝑠𝑟, ca𝑟, 𝜑𝑟, V𝑟, 𝑡𝑟) ∈ 𝑅 | 𝑠𝑟 = 𝑠, ca𝑟
= ca, 𝜑𝑟 = 𝜑𝑗}
(4)
The QoCA for the personal dimension of trust factor 𝜑𝑗
for the certification authority ca can be calculated by the TB
service (𝜀) as follows:
QoCAPersonal (𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) =
∑𝑖∈𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 𝜌 (𝑡𝑐, 𝑡𝑖) ∗ 𝑊
𝑖
𝜑𝑗
𝑛 ,
(5)
where (i) 𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 represents all the personal evaluations of
the TB service (𝜀) about the ca for the trust factor 𝜑𝑗.
(ii) 𝑊𝑖𝜑𝑗 is the difference between the value promised in
the CPS and the actual value calculated by the TB service
for the recommendation 𝑖. (iii) 𝜌(𝑡𝑐, 𝑡𝑖) is a time-dependent
function that gives more importance to the most recent
recommendations, where 𝑡𝑐 is the current time and 𝑡𝑖 is the
time when recommendation 𝑖 has been stored. We do not fix
this function, because this function can be defined in several
ways depending on the type of trust factor. This is part of
the intellectual property of the TB. (iv) 𝑛 is the number of
evaluations stored in 𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 .
𝑊𝑖𝜑𝑗 can be calculated using this function:
𝑊𝜑𝑗 =
{{{{
{{{{
{
𝑈(𝑉𝜑𝑗) ∗ 100
𝑈(𝑉𝐶𝜑𝑗)
𝑈(𝑉𝜑𝑗) < 𝑈(𝑉𝐶𝜑𝑗)
1 otherwise,
(6)
where (i)𝑉𝜑𝑗 is the measured value of trust factor 𝜑𝑗, (ii)𝑉𝐶𝜑𝑗
is the promised value by the CA in its CPS for the trust factor
𝜑𝑗, and (iii) 𝑈 is the utility function.
QoCASoc(𝜑𝑗) is the QoCA value for the social dimension
of each atomic trust factor (𝜑𝑗); it can be calculated as follows:
QoCASoc (𝜑𝑗) = ∑
𝑠∈𝑆
𝜉𝑠QoCAPersonal (𝑅𝑠→ca𝜑𝑗 ) , (7)
where (i) 𝑆 is the global set of identifiable recommenders,
including auditors, RPs, and competitor TBs and (ii) 𝜉𝑠 is a
parameter associated with each recommender 𝑠. It is used to
control the impact of each recommender on the final score
where ∑𝑠∈𝑆 𝜉𝑠 = 1. This forms yet another component of the
intellectual property of the TB.
For each trust factor, the personal dimension and the
social one can be combined to obtain one trust score as
follows:
Eval (𝜑𝑗) = 𝛼 ∗QoCAPersonal (𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) + 𝛽
∗QoCASoc (𝜑𝑗) ,
(8)
where (i) 𝛼, 𝛽 are configurable parameters that control the
impact of the personal and social dimension on the final
score, where 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1.
The ontological dimension allows the TB to calculate the
final value of QoCA.The QoCAOnto value for a leaf or a node
can be calculated as follows:
QoCAOnto (𝜑𝑖) = ∑
𝜑𝑗∈children(𝜑𝑖)
𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 ∗QoCA
Onto (𝜑𝑗) , (9)
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where (i)QoCAOnto(𝜑𝑗) = QoCASoc(𝜑𝑗)when𝜑𝑗 is an atomic
trust factor, (ii) 𝜑𝑖 is a leaf or a node, and (iii) 𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 is the
weighting factor between nodes 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜑𝑗 in the tree CP/CPS.
Each TB will have their own values for the various weighting
factors.
The final value of QoCA is QoCAOnto for the factor
CPSdocument which is the root of the CP/CPS tree:
QoCA = QoCAOnto (CPSdocument) . (10)
4.3. Calculation of the Confidence Level (CL). The confidence
level (CL) states to which extent the TB service is confident
about the calculation of QoCA. Many factors can be consid-
ered, but here we considered the three major factors:
(i) Number of Recommendations. For each trust factor,
a minimum threshold of recommendations is set. If
the threshold is not reached then the reliability of the
trust factor cannot be established.When a trust factor
can only be evaluated by audit agencies, the threshold
is set to 1, otherwise it should be greater than 1.
(ii) RecommendationsHeterogeneity.Themore the values
of recommendations are homogenous, the more the
calculation of QoCA is reliable. This factor is not
taken into account when the recommender is an audit
agency.
(iii) Recommendation Dates. The more recent the rec-
ommendations are, the more reliable they are. This
parameter is considered for all types of recom-
menders.
The CL for the personal dimension and for the trust
factor 𝜑𝑗 is the convex combination of the three functions
representing the three aforementioned factors:
CLPersonal (𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) = 𝛾𝑁 ∗ 𝑁𝑖 (𝑅
𝜀→ca
𝜑𝑗
) + 𝛾𝐷𝑡
∗ 𝐷𝑡 (𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) + 𝛾Decay
∗ Decay (𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) ,
(11)
where (i) 𝛾𝑁 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 + 𝛾Decay = 1 allows the TB to control
the impact of each factor on the final score and forms part
of its intellectual property. (ii) 𝑁𝑖(𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) = {sin((1/2 ∗
𝑖𝑡𝑚)|𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 |), |𝑅
𝜀→ca
𝜑𝑗
| ∈ [0, 𝑖𝑡𝑚]; 1,Otherwise}; (iii) |𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 | is
the carinality of 𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ; (iv) 𝑖𝑡𝑚 is the threshold after which
the confidence value always becomes 1; (v) 𝐷𝑡(𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) = 1 −
∑𝑖∈𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 |𝑤𝑖 − 𝑤| gives a value between 0 and 1. The value 0
indicates that the recommendations are so different (i.e., not
reliable). The value 1 indicates that the recommendations are
homogenous and can be considered reliable. 𝑤 is the average
of the recommendations values. (vi) Decay(𝑅𝜀→ca𝜑𝑗 ) is a time-
dependent function that gives values between 0 and 1. It is
used to indicate the freshness of recommendations owned by
an entity.
CLSoc represents the CL value after considering the social
dimension. It can be calculated as follows:
CLSoc (𝜑𝑗) = ∑
𝑠∈𝑆
𝜉𝑠CLPersonal (𝑅𝑠→ca𝜑𝑗 ) , (12)
where (i) 𝑆 is the global set of identifiable recommenders,
including auditors, RPs, and competitor TBs and (ii) 𝜉𝑠 is a
parameter associated with each recommender 𝑠. It is used to
control the impact of each recommender on the final score
where ∑𝑠∈𝑆 𝜉𝑠 = 1. This forms yet another component of the
intellectual property of the TB.
For each trust factor, the personal dimension and the
social one can be combined to obtain one trust score as
follows:
Eval (𝜑𝑗) = 𝛼 ∗ CLSoc (𝜑𝑗) + 𝛽
∗∑
𝑠∈𝑆
𝜉𝑠CLPersonal (𝑅𝑠→ca𝜑𝑗 ) .
(13)
(i) 𝛼 and 𝛽 are configurable parameters that control the
impact of the personal and social dimension on the final
score, where 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1.
The ontological dimension allows the TB to calculate the
final value of CL. The CLOnto for a leaf or a node can be
calculated as follows:
CLOnto (𝜑𝑖) = ∑
𝜑𝑗∈children(𝜑𝑖)
𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 ∗ CL
Onto (𝜑𝑗) , (14)
where (i) CLOnto(𝜑𝑗) = CLSoc(𝜑𝑗) when 𝜑𝑗 is an atomic trust
factor, (ii) 𝜑𝑖 is a leaf or a node, and (iii) 𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 is the weighting
factor between nodes 𝜑𝑖 and 𝜑𝑗 in the tree CP/CPS. Each TB
will have their own values for the various weighting factors.
The final value of CL is CLOnto for the factor CPSdocu-
ment which is the root of the CP/CPS tree:
CL = CLOnto (CPSdocument) . (15)
4.4. Discussion. Our trust model offers two principal advan-
tages; first, it reflects the different points of view of TBs by
allowing them to configure their own expertise into their
computations. Second, it resolves the problem of interop-
erability by adopting a calculation method based on utility
functions and weighting factors. Indeed, the utility functions
𝑈(𝑉𝜑𝑗) and the weight factors 𝜇𝜑𝑖𝜑𝑗 allow several different
strategies for trust calculations.
It should be noted that our evaluation system is designed
to consider not only technical issues but also juridical ones.
Thus, it is impossible to fix these trust metrics as they
reflect the flavour of TBs and their own expertise and
preferences. It is true that some trust factors can be objectively
measured, but their relevance for a given application remains
a subjective matter. For example, it is clear that SHA-512
is stronger than SHA-256 for the trust factor of the hash
algorithm. But the relevance of SHA-256 for an application
such as web server authentication is still a subjective question
for experts. Chadwick and Basden [35] have demonstrated
this phenomenon by asking PKI experts to prioritize the
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Figure 9: The prototype architecture.
PKIs trust factors.The study concluded by demonstrating the
difficulty in reaching a consensus among experts. Chadwick
and Basden gave several reasons for this difficulty.
Our trust model enables the resolving of interoperability
problems. In fact, TBs can adapt their calculation models
to meet the needs of their clients as well as the context of
use. For example, in Greece, a certificate has legal effect, if
the retention period of electronic records is over 30 years,
while in Spain it is only 15 years [36]. The utility function
that processes this trust factor can give a high importance
for a certificate that has a retention period of 15 years when
the certificate is used in Spain and low importance when the
certificate is used in Greece. Another example is the use of
pseudonyms in certificates. Most European countries, except
Estonia and Bulgaria [36], authorize the use of pseudonyms
in certificates.The TB service is able to deal with this problem
of interoperability between European countries using utility
functions. When a certificate with a pseudonym is used in
Estonia or Bulgaria, the utility function that processes this
trust factor gives a value of 0 for this certificate.
Finally, our calculation system prevents collusion from
unidentified entities. However, collusion from identified enti-
ties is difficult to prevent, especially if the number of conspir-
ators is greater than the number of honest entities. However,
each TB will be contractually linked to the identified entities
(audit agencies, other TBs, and users). If something goes
wrong, the conspirators can be prosecuted.
5. Prototype in the Web Context
We have implemented a prototype in the context of the web,
where the RPs are human entities accessing various websites
via a web browser. Certificate holders are the users who
purchase certificates for their web servers. Our prototype TB
web service comprises two principal components (as shown
in Figure 9):
Trust factor list
XML parser
Calculation of
CLoA, QoCPS,
QoCA, and CL
Recommendations 
collection
TB Service
Figure 10: The TB service modules.
(i) Decision helper component: this component helps
RPs make contextually informed decisions about
certificates.
(ii) Recommendation collector component: this compo-
nent collects recommendations sent by client RPs.
The TB service consists of the following modules
(Figure 10):
(i) The trust factors list module contains the TB’s list of
trust factors in XML format.
(ii) The XML parser module processes the XML trust
files provided by either the cooperating CAs or the
TB (for noncooperating CAs). Each trust file contains
the answers to the list of trust factors for one CA,
reflecting its certification policies andprocedures (i.e.,
values for the trust factors).
(iii) The recommendations collection module collects the
recommendations sent by client RPs.
(iv) The calculation module computes the CLoA, QoCPS,
QoCA, and CL.
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<!ELEMENT KeySizes (f1 615, f2 615, f3 615, f4 615)>
<!ATTLIST KeySizes id (6.1.5) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f1 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f1 615 KeySize (256| 512| 1024| 2048| 4096| other)
#REQUIRED algorithm (RSA| ElGamal |Merkle-Hellman | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f2 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f2 615 Hash (SHA-1 | SHA-224|MD5 | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f3 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f3 615 KeySize (256| 512| 1024| 2048| 4096| other)
#REQUIRED algorithm (RSA| ElGamal |Merkle-Hellman | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f4 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f4 615 Hash (SHA-1| SHA-224|MD5 | other) #REQUIRED>
Listing 1: The Key Size trust factor for a particular TB service.
<KeySizes id=” 6.1.5 ”>
<f1 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f2 615 Hash=”MD5”/>
<f3 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f4 615 Hash=”MD5”/>
</KeySizes>
Listing 2: An example trust data structure for a particular CA.
In addition we have implemented a Firefox extension
module that modifies the way that Firefox handles certifi-
cates, by first communicatingwith the TB service.TheTB ser-
vice interacts with CAs and with RP clients. In the following
section we give more details about these interactions.
5.1. Interaction between TB Service and CAs. The list of trust
factors is made public by the TB service. It is constructed
using the XML DTD format. For example, we have defined
the DTD component for the leaf “Key Sizes” as shown below
in Listing 3. This depicts the structure of the leaf “Key Sizes”
in the CP/CPS tree. It contains four atomic factors of trust:
“the size of the CA’s public key and the key algorithm,” “the
hash algorithm used for the CA’s certificate,” “the size of the
public key of the user’s certificate and its key algorithm,” and
“the hash algorithm used for the user’s certificate.”
Each cooperating CA picks up the trust factor list and
returns an XML file that contains answers to the atomic
factors (see Figure 11). The cooperating CA sends this file
back to the TB service in order for it to determine the
QoCPS. For noncooperating CAs, the TB must retrieve the
CA’s CP/CPS and answer the questions themselves. (S)he can
then submit the resulting file to the XML parser. The XML
component for the node≪Key Sizes≫ trust element can take
the form presented in Listing 2. If a CA uses a value that is not
already referenced in the DTD list of trust factors, then the
actual value must be labelled as “other” before the trust file is
returned to the TB (see Listing 3). For example, for the trust
factor “Key Sizes,” a CA may use the value “SHA-512.” This
<KeySizes id=”6.1.5" >
<f1 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f2 615 Hash=” other”> SHA-512</f2 615>
<f3 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f4 615 Hash=”MD5”></f4 615>
</KeySizes>
Listing 3: An example trust data structure returning a value
unknown to the TB service.
Trust factor list
XML parser Recommendations collection
TB Service
CA
Calculation of
CLoA, QoCPS,
QoCA, and CL
Figure 11: Interaction of TB service with CAs.
value is not included in Listing 1 for this particular TB service,
so the QoCPS cannot be analysed automatically. When the
TB service receives the trust file, it should update the utility
function for this new value and update the list of referenced
values in the DTD.
5.2. Interaction between TB Service and Clients. There are
two types of interactions between the TB service and its
RP clients: interaction for helping clients to make informed
decision about certificates and interaction for receiving rec-
ommendations from clients about certain trust factors of
CAs.
5.2.1. Helping Clients to Make Informed Decision. There are
four main actors in this case (Figure 12):
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Figure 12: The main actors in 4-cornered based validation system.
(i) The RP: the end user that will ultimately make the
decision to accept or reject a certificate. The RP
chooses its own web browser.
(ii) The browser extension module (TB client): the entity
that allows RPs to communicate with TB services.
It manages the decisions of RPs about certificates.
It should also provide an interface to enable RPs to
select the TB service that they wish to depend on. Our
objective is to make web browsers totally transparent
in the decision-making process.
(iii) TheTB service: the entity that calculates the certificate
quality information.
(iv) The web browser: the entity that forwards the CA
certificate to the TB client.
Figure 13 illustrates the different steps that we have
implemented to realize the validation of certificates.
When a user contacts a web service via an TLS connec-
tion, for example, to make an online payment, the user wants
to be assured that their information is sent to the correct web
service and that any received information comes from the
right service.
The web server initially sends its certificate to the web
browser. It is not possible at this point in time for the web
browser to discover the RP’s intended use of the certificate.
This is because the server’s web page can define several
contexts of certificate use. For example, when a user vis-
its the site https://www.somesite.com, the homepage may
have two forms that define two different contexts of use;
the first form allows the user to connect to the server
https://www.login.somesite.com and the second form allows
the user to register by sending information to the server
https://www.register.somesite.com. Before sending themper-
sonal or confidential data to either of these servers, the user’s
browser must retrieve the server’s address and extract the
certificate that is used to determine if (s)he can trust the
certificate of the server for the specific context. We have
identified three different contexts of use for a user sending
personal or confidential data to a web server:
(1) Connection login: the user will send a username
and password to the web server and thereafter will
establish a secure session duringwhichmanydifferent
types of transaction may take place, for example,
database access, file access, and online transaction.
(2) Registration: the user will send her personal informa-
tion to the web server in order to create an account.
(3) Payment: the userwill send her bank account or credit
card details to the server in order to buy a product.
The user may or may not be logged in.
Our extension module monitors the behaviour of the user
to see when (s)he will send their personal information to a
server. When the user clicks on the send button, the module
extension suspends the sending, extracts the certificate, and
requests the quality information about the certificate from the
TB service. The TB service returns the quality information
signed by its public key (which was configured into the exten-
sionwhen the user chose her trusted TB service).Themodule
extension will then filter the returned information based on
the certificate’s context of use.When the context of use cannot
be determined then it shows themost informative/qualitative
information about the certificate to the user.
The browser extension tries to automatically determine
the context of use based on the content of the personal data
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Figure 13: Illustration of certificate validation steps.
being requested. For example, when a single field of type
“password” exists in a web form, we assume the form is used
to allow users to login to the server. When there are two
fields of type “password,” we assume the form is used for
the registration of new users. When there is a field of type
credit card type or credit card number, we assume a payment
is about to be made. However, we recognize that this is not
always the case and that there are other caseswherewe cannot
determine the intended use of the certificate. Consequently,
we have prepared a simple questionnaire (see Figure 15) that
appears when the user first wants to send information to a
server over a TLS connection.This allows the user to confirm
or alter the automatically determined context of use.
The quality information returned to the user in case of
connection login (see the GUI in Figure 14) is as follows:
(i) CLoA, called Identity Assurance in the GUI
(ii) The name of the certificate holder, called Contacted
Web Site in the GUI
(iii) The name of the certification authority, called Identity
Verified By in the GUI
(iv) A link towards the certificate’s CP/CPS, called Agree-
ment of Certificate Usage in the GUI
Figure 14:Making a decision about a certificate used for connection
login.
(v) The financial protection offered to the client by the
CA, in case of false certificate information
Any additional information that might be important to the
client is sent by the TB service. For example, when the user
wants to buy a product, the allowed maximum money to
pay for the purchase is critical information (Figure 16). If the
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Figure 15: Determining the context of use for a certificate.
Figure 16: Making a decision about a certificate used for providing
payment information.
client wants to purchase a product whose price is higher than
the protection offered by the CA in its CP, then he/she loses
the right to be fully covered by financial protection.Thus it is
important to inform the client about this fact.
When the user makes a decision about a certificate, we
record this decision and the context of use in a local store
of the web browser along with the CA’s certificate and CLoA
score. In this way, the extension module will not ask the user
to remake a decision about the same context of use for any
web server certificate issued by the same CA. However, the
extension will ask the user to remake a decision about any
of the CA’s issued certificates if its quality information has
changed since the last time the decision was made or the
context of use is different.
When the user wants to connect to or register with a
server, the allowed decisions are only “accept” or “reject” the
certificate. But when the client wants to send information
related to a commercial transaction, the decision becomes
“refuse/terminate the transaction,” “accept only for this
transaction,” or “accept for all transactions.” We have added
the middle option allowing a decision to be taken for each
transaction because the risks associated with a payment vary
according to the amount of the transaction. We therefore
adapt our user interface to the context of the certificate’s use.
5.3. Recommendations Collecting. The TB service can auto-
matically collect recommendations when its RP clients are
using server certificates. There are several trust factors that
can be automatically verified by the browser extension. In
our prototype, we monitor the profiles of certificates and the
availability of OCSP servers.
TheTB service sends to the browser extensionmodule the
profile of certificates issued by the server’s CA.The extension
checks the server’s certificate against the certificate profile and
notifies the TB service when a violation is detected.
In addition, we verify the requirements imposed on cer-
tificate profiles of “extended validation” certificates. Accord-
ing to the guidelines of the CA/Browser Forum [37] Extended
Validation (EV) certificates must meet a number of strict
requirements concerning the subject name, the crypto-
graphic algorithms, the key usage field, and revocation infor-
mation. Our TB service defines the XML profile presented in
Listing 4 that contains all these requirements.
When the browser extension detects any problem related
to a certificate’s profile, it asks the user for permission to send
the certificate to the TB service, along with the identified
problem. In addition, the browser extension also checks the
availability of OCSP servers and reports to the TB service
when one is not available.
Before recording any recommendations about a CA, the
TB service checks if they are correct or not. If correct, it
records a positive or negative recommendation about the
concerned trust factor.
6. How Can the 4-Cornered Trust Model
Improve the Security of Web Users?
Superfish and the other incidents demonstrate one fact:
no one has assumed the responsibility or liability for any
consequences related to these incidents. From a theoretical
point of view, only the CAs are liable to the web users in
case of problems. In practice, web users are not able to
prosecute CAs because they are not technically able to prove
the responsibility of CAs.
Nevertheless, even when the web users are able to prove
the responsibility of CAs, they will not be protected com-
pletely. Superfish and eDellRoot incidents have shown how
it is possible to intercept the TLS communications of web
users without necessarily compromising the systems of CAs
or asking them to issue false certificates.
The main reason for this situation is that the web TLS
system is designed so that web users must depend on a
multitude of entities, other than CAs, in order to secure their
transactions. As an examplewewill compare the intermediate
entities in the case of the current validation system with the
entities implied in the case of our proposal.
Figure 17(a) shows an example of the entities that are
intervening in the current validation system. This represents
a web user that uses a Windows OS and uses different web
browsers for surfing the web, including Firefox. The first
important issue to note is that web users do not have any
assigned tasks to achieve. Everything is executed without
their knowledge. From a usability point of view, this issue can
be seen as an advantage. However, from the security point of
view, the current validation system compromises the security
of web users because they depend on unknown entities to
secure their transactions. In Figure 17(a), we recognize that
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<?xml version= 1 .0? >
<CertProfile>
<! Verisign CA id of EV Certificate ––>
<CAId value=” 3 C : 48 : 42 : 0D : FF : 58 : 1A : 38 : 86 : BC : FD : 41 : D4 : 8A : 41 : DE” />
<Profile Version value=” 5.0” />
<Subject type=” field” component=”O” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” field” component=”CN” presence=” Obligatory”
value=” dnshostname” valueExclude=”∗” />
<Subject type=” field” component=”C” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” field” component=”L” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” field” component=”ST” presence=” Obligatory” />
<! –– : this field MUST contain the Registration (or similar)
Number assigned to the Subject by the Incorporating or Registration
Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration––>
<Subject component=” Object␣Identifier.∗2␣5␣4␣5.∗” Type=” field”
presence=” Obligatory”/>
<!–– : The validity period for an EV Certificate SHALL NOT exceed
twenty seven months.––>
<Validity type=” field” value=” 27” />
<DigestSignatureAlgorithm value=” (SHA-1|SHA-256|SHA-384|SHA-512)” />
<KeySize component=” Key␣Size” value=” (1024|2048)” />
<!–– : MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical. The set of
policyIdentifiers MUST include the identifier for the CAs extended
validation policy.––>
<Certificate Policies type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” oid” />
<!–– : SHOULD be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. It MUST
contain the HTTP URL of the CAs CRL service. This extension MUST
be present if the certificate does not specify OCSP responder.––>
<CRL Distribution Point type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” httpservicehost” />
<!–– : SHOULD be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. SHALL
contain the HTTP URL of the CAs OCSP responder. This extension
MUST be present if the certificate does not contain a
cRLDistributionPoint extension.––>
<Authority Information Access type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” httpservicehost” />
<!–– : the presence of key usage extension is optional. If present,
the CA field MUST be set false.––>
<Basic Constraints type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=”optional” value=” false” />
<!–– : the presence of key usage extension is optional. If present,
bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign MUST NOT be set––>
<key Usage type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Optional” valueExclude=” (Certificate␣Signer|CRL␣Signer)” />
</ CertProfile>
Listing 4: Example of XML profile for EVS certificate.
Microsoft and Mozilla are the “official” TBs because they are
the entities that realize tasks 1 and 2 on behalf of theweb users.
We have put the term official in quotation marks because the
web users did not delegate officially Microsoft or Mozilla to
achieve tasks 1 and 2 on behalf of them. If something goes
wrong, Microsoft and Mozilla will not refund web users in
case of problems. In addition, certificate distributers do not
have the obligation to help web users to prosecute malevolent
CAs in case of loss.
The Superfish incident was produced because Lenovo
had an access to the list of CAs provided by Microsoft.
Lenovo injected the certificate of a self-signed CA and used
its software Superfish to intercept the TLS communications
of Lenovo users (i.e., MITM attack). Naturally, users are
not able to detect such kind of problems, because the
current validation system is designed so that everything
is executed transparently without the knowledge of web
users.
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Figure 17: A comparison between the current validation system and the 4-cornered validation system.
The MITM attacks would not be possible if the integrity
of the trust list is guaranteed, that is, ensuring that the
OS/Browser editors and web users are the only authorized
entities to modify the trust lists. Unfortunately, this is not
enough because web users have to use web browsers to com-
plete the validation process. Web users may use known web
browsers such as Google Chrome and Firefox, but they may
use also unknown ones for completing the validation process.
Georgiev et al. [38] demonstrate that SSL certificate validation
is completely broken in many security-critical applications
and libraries.Themain reason is that developers tend to badly
configure the APIs of different SSL implementations (such
as JSSE, OpenSSL, and GnuTLS) and data-transport libraries
(such as cURL).
Finally, from the usability point of view, the current
validation system confuses the web users. In the current
validation system, the roles that the intermediate entities
should play are not clearly defined. Any intermediate entity
has the right to execute one or more of the obligations of
web users. For example, Firefox has selected to achieve the
four tasks whereas Google Chrome achieves only tasks 3
(partially) and 4. If one web user uses Google Chrome on
two different platforms (e.g., Windows and Linux) (s)he may
get different validation results for the same website because
the trust list of Windows is not the same as Linux. On the
other side, if one web user uses Firefox and Google Chrome
on the same platform (e.g., Windows) (s)he may get also two
different validation results for the same website because the
trust list of Mozilla is not the same as Windows.
The 4-cornered trust model solves the aforementioned
problems by creating a physical relation between the RP and
the TB, who is a technical and legal expert in the domain
of PKI. RPs (web users) need only one certificate, which is
the public key certificate of the TB. Instead thus of having to
observe the integrity of infinite trust lists, RPs need only to
observe the integrity of one public key certificate, regardless
of the nature and number of platforms and applications used
by them.
With the 4-cornered trust model, whenever a user gets
a new platform, (s)he should link their platform to the
validation service proposed by the TB with whom the user
has a contract. It should be possible to choose from a set
of available TBs. Configuring the TB consists only in setting
the URL and the certificate of the TB service. Any software
installed on the platform of the user must use the selected
validation service. The OSs have to remove the ability of
software to realize validation services, especially when a user
selects a TB.
With 4-cornered validation system, the web browsers are
completely neutralized. The only task that they should make
is to forward the certificate of the website to the TB client.
Thus, if the web user has chosen an unknown web browser
to surf the web, this will not affect the security of his TLS
transactions (Figure 17(b)).
In real scenarios, the TB might be misconfigured or has
poor software. This will not cause problems for the web
users because the web user is insured by the TB for any
loss or damage (s)he may suffer. Therefore, the user does
not lose out if the TB makes a mistake for any reason. This
is not the case for a misconfigured CA trust list, where
the user does lose out. The only way to compromise the
security of user’s transactions is to misconfigure the TB
setting. This can be easily protected. For example, the X.509
V3 certificate has an extensions section that allows adding
additional information to X.509 certificate. Consequently, TB
may include a new extension in its certificate that contains
the URL of its validation service. During each request, the
TB client shall compare the requested URL with the one
contained in the certificate of the TB. The advantage of our
proposal is that each user is linked to only one TB and not to
multiple TBs. It is a fundamental improvement of the PKI’s
trust model that has been adopted in the newX.509 standard.
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In addition, multiple implementations might be proposed
by different TBs. This is good from a security perspective.
If one implementation is used by all TBs, one flaw in this
implementation means that all TBs are flawed.
7. Conclusion and Future Works
The original X.509 trust model is only appropriate for the
closed deployment model of PKIs, in which the RPs and
subjects both have predefined relations with the CAs. It is not
appropriate for the open deploymentmodel where the RP has
no explicit relationship with any CA.
The existing trust approaches are not adapted to the
needs of RPs to make informed decisions in the PKI open
deployment model. As a result, PKIs remain isolated islands
in the open model. Each PKI seeks to comply only with the
requirements of the jurisdictionwhere the premises of its root
CA are located.Thus, the RPs have to handle this PKI (lack of)
interoperability issue. The various harmonization attempts
at regional and international level have not come up with a
solution to the PKI interoperability problem.
PKI trust management is extremely complex; therefore
only technical and legal experts can perform it. It is not
conceivable to delegate this task to the RPs who generally
are “normal” people. Thus, X.509 has defined a new entity
in its upcoming trust model, called the Trust Broker (TB),
who is a technical and juridical expert. This new approach to
trust management is applicable to both the closed and open
deployment models of PKI. We have defined six criteria for
trust evaluation that this approach should follow.
Contrary to the 3-cornered trust model, the applicability
of the 4-cornered model does not depend on the good
practices of the CAs and their certificate holders. The TB
varies its scores about the CAs, according to their com-
mitments to their policies and to their commitments for
ensuring that their certificate holders remain responsible or
take appropriate actions in case of malpractice.
Based on these six criteria, we have proposed a trust
calculation model, which identifies and quantifies the quality
of certificates. This quality information is represented by a
score between 0 and 1 indicating the quality of the certificate
(CLoA). This is computed from the quality of the CA’s
procedures (QoCPS), the ability of the CA to conform to
its published procedures, and a confidence level between 0
and 1 indicating the reliability of the quality calculation and
other information that depends on the context of use of the
certificate. To calculate the values of CLoA we have proposed
the following:
(i) To transform policy documents (CP/CPS) into a
format that can be understood by computers since the
natural language used to describe the policy of a CA
is one of the main obstacles to determining trust in a
CA
(ii) Based on RFC 3647, we have structured CP/CPS
documents as a hierarchical tree composed of nodes
and leaves
(iii) To integrate the role of RPs, certificate holders, and
competitor TB services to supplement the work of
audit agencies in evaluating the real practices of CAs
(iv) To calculate the quality of CAs (QoCA) based on the
REGRET model, while allowing TBs the flexibility to
incorporate their own intellectual property in order
to gain competitive advantage over other TBs
The trust relationship between the RP clients of a TB service
and the TB is an important issue. We propose that it
should be a contractual relationship that gives warranties and
commitments to the RP clients. The trust that a client must
have in its TB should not be based on the evaluation strategy
adopted by the TB. Chadwick and Basden [35] has showed
that even PKI experts cannot reach a consensus about the
importance of a CA’s security parameters. As a consequence,
the RP’s trust should be that the contracted TB will make its
best efforts to protect them, but if something goes wrong, the
warranties of the signed contract will effectively alleviate the
problem.
Finally, we have chosen to implement a prototype system
in the context of theweb to showhow Internet users canmake
informed decisions about web server certificates, aided by a
TB, without compromising their privacy.
In the short-term, we propose to conduct some usability
experiments to measure the advantages that our prototype
offers to end users.
In the long-term, further work must be conducted to
enrich the assurance information presented to users. The
CLoA information is important but not sufficient to give the
overall assurance level for a transaction. The provision of
assurance services requires the intervention of other entities
whose natures and roles depend on the context of a trans-
action between the interested parties. For example, attribute
authorities may be required to assure end users that the
services do possess certain attributes.The role of these entities
can be extended according to the context of a transaction.
We need to extend this work to deal with all elements of the
chain of a transaction. Each element, depending on its role,
mustmeet certain criteria.Thus, instead of providing only the
CLoA score, the system could provide a score including the
level of quality of all elements of the chain.
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